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THE JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS'
INTRODUCTION
Each year, the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal fosters the creation of a
symposium on an issue of contemporary constitutional significance. This year's
topic, The Judicial Appointments Process, explores the manner in which federal
judges are selected, from the framers' intended achievement of a balance of powers
via the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, to the current presidential
administration's selection of nominees. The five articles developed for this
symposium provide detailed examination of various aspects of the judicial
appointments process and suggest ways in which it may be maintained or adjusted
to best serve the interests of democracy and the Constitution.
Judicial appointments are important because judges matter, not just to
academics, politicians, and practitioners, but to all Americans.' Judges play an
increasingly significant role in everyday life decisions.' It follows that the process
by which they are selected matters.' It likewise follows that because of the
perceived importance of appointing judges, the appointments process breeds
contention.
Disagreement over the appointments process is not a recent phenomenon.' The
This symposium was conceived and coordinated by Bryce Hunter, the Bill of Rights
Journal's 2000-2001 Symposium Editor and a 2001 graduate ofthe William & Mary School
of Law.
2 See generally Edwin Meese III, Foreword to JUDICIAL SELECTION: MERIT, IDEOLOGY,
AND POLITICS, ix (National Legal Center for the Public Interest ed., 1990); Carl Tobias, The
Bush Administration andAppeals Court Nominees, 10 WM &MARYBILLRTS J. 103 (2001).
See Meese, supra note 2, at ix:
[O]ver the past thirty years or so the federal courts have come to exercise
increasing power over the daily affairs of the American people. On issues from
abortion to court-ordered busing, from affirmative action plans to the rights of
those accused of crime, the federal courts, from the Supreme Court down to the
District Courts, have become ever more deeply immersed in the policy battles of
the day.
See also Tobias, supra note 2.
" Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Olga Shvetsova, Comparing Judicial Selection Systems,
10 WM & MARY BILL RTS J. 7, n.9 (2001) ("It is fairly certain that no single subject has
consumed as many pages in law reviews and law-related publications over the past 50 years
as the subject ofjudicial selection.") (quoting Philip Dubois).
5 See generally id.; Eugene W. Hickok, Jr., Judicial Selection: The Political Roots of
Advice and Consent, in JUDICIAL SELECTION: MERIT, IDEOLOGY, AND POLITICS, 3-11 (1990)
(describing specific instances of controversy from the Constitutional Convention to the
confirmation hearings of Judge Robert Bork).
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Founding Fathers' sometimes "heated" debates over how best to divide the
responsibilities for finding and approving public officials occupied the
Constitutional Convention for many months.' The product of this deliberation was
the Appointments Clause.7 This brief section of the Constitution states that the
president nominates and appointsjudges with the advice and consent of the Senate.8
Although easily stated, the history of the Appointments Clause is one of great
conflict.9
In later years, the focus of criticism shifted from the process of appointment to
the character, abilities, and politics of the nominees themselves.' Despite the
attention paid to the process of appointing judges, there are no actual qualifications
or standards forjudicial nominees." The de facto imposition of standards was thus
left to be determined by the acts of the president and the Senate.
The grueling senate confirmation hearings of the past few decades indicate that
appointments are as contentious now as they have ever been. 2 The divisive process
is exacerbated by a perceived "crisis" in the federal judiciary cause by a high
number of vacancies on the bench. 3 The actions of the new presidential
6 See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 17-28 (2000).
7 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
Id. The Appointments Clause states that the president "shall nominate, and by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint... Judges of the Supreme Court, and
all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and which shall be established by Law." Id.
9 GERHARDT, supra note 6 at 15-38, 135-79 (discussing the Senate's role in all
appointments, including judicial appointments).
'o See generally id. at 45-80.
" Compare this with detailed threshold qualifications (age, citizenship, and residency
requirements) for the president and members of Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2
(qualifications for representatives), U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (senators), U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 1, cl. 5 (qualifications for the president).
2 The confirmation hearings of Judge Robert Bork are generally viewed as the watershed
event that heralded a new era of scrutiny. See Carl Tobias, The Bush Administration and
Appeals Court Nominees, 10 WM & MARY BILL RTs J. 103 (2001) ("[T]he controversial
battle which ensued over Bork's confirmation substantially changed modem judicial selection
and the event's repercussion's continue."). Id. at 105. Bork, a 1987 Reagan nominee to the
Supreme Court, was ultimately rejected by the Senate after a probing inquiry into Bork's
ideological composition. See GERHARDT, supra note 6, at 2.
"3 As of October 17, 2001, out of 862 authorized federal judgeships, 110 vacancies
existed with 52 nominees awaiting confirmation. See Vacancy Summary, at
http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/summary.htnil (last visited Dec. 15, 2001). See also
Judicial Emergencies, at http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/emergencies.htm (last visited
Dec. 15, 2001) (listing critical bench positions vacant since as early as 1994).
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administration reflect an awareness of these challenges.' 4 It remains critical that all
interested parties understand the mechanisms and motivations of the judicial
appointments process. The five articles comprising this symposium examine
various aspects of the judicial appointments process and several different stages of
proceedings.
In The ABA 's Role in Prescreening Federal Judicial Candidates,'" Professor
Laura Little weighs the merits of the George W. Bush Administration's
controversial decision to end the half-century practice of soliciting the pre-
nomination opinion of the American Bar Association (ABA) with respect to
potential judicial candidates.' 6 Little asks "whether ABA participation early in the
process is best for the nation."' 7 Her analysis focuses on the history of the ABA's
involvement in the appointments process, the organization's purpose and activities,
and whether the ABA's involvement in a screening capacity is consistent with the
Constitution and the Founding Fathers' conception of the appointments process.
Little's conclusion is a "qualified yes"' 8 in favor of ABA participation that suggests
a modified role for the organization's contributions.
Professor Carl Tobias focuses on the current administration's selection of
candidates for the United States Courts of Appeals.2° Tobias first examines the
recent history of appointments under a quarter-century of presidents, including the
watershed confirmation battle over Judge Robert Bork." Tobias explains how
nominees are proposed and evaluated in the absence of ABA participation.2" He
then suggests lessons that may be derived from George W. Bush's first eleven
appellate court nominations.2 3 Finally, Tobias presents suggestions for the selection
'4 These changes include the removal of the American Bar Association from the pre-
nomination screening process. See Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the
President, to Martha W. Barnett, President, American Bar Association (Mar. 22, 2001),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/2001 0322-5.html; Carl
Tobias, The Bush Administration andAppeals Court Nominees, 10 WM & MARY BILL RTS
J. 103 (2001) (citing the removal of the presentation of appellate court nominees in a manner
traditionally reserved for Supreme Court nominees).
's Laura E. Little, The ABA 's Role in Prescreening Federal Judicial Candidates: Are We
Ready to Give Up on the Lawyers?, 10 WM & MARY BILL RTS J. 37 (2001).
16 See id.
'7 Id. at 38.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Carl Tobias, The Bush Administration andAppeals Court Nominees, 10 WM & MARY
BILLRTS J. 103 (2001).
21 See id.
22 See id.
23 See id.
2001]
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of future nominees, including limiting the emphasis placed on a candidate's
ideology.24
Professor William Ross presents a detailed examination, rich in anecdotal
accounts, of a nominee's treatment before the Senate.25 Ross describes the
confirmation process as both a challenge and an opportunity to a judicial
candidate.26 He describes the Senate's concern with various factors such as a
nominee's professional qualifications27 and integrity. Ross pays particular
attention to the Senate's consideration of political philosophies.29 He questions the
effectiveness of congressional inquiry on issues of "judicial activism"30 and a
"living Constitution."'" Ross then provides suggestions for ways in which increased
genuine dialogue between nominees and the Senate may occur.
In The 'Blue Slip': Enforcing the Norms of the Judicial Confirmation
Process,32 Professor Brannon Denning sheds light on an "obscure Senate custom"
known as the blue slip.33 This device allows a single senator from a nominee's
home state to blackball the nominee.34 Denning discusses the history of the practice
and the effect of the blue slip on Senate operations. He questions the
constitutionality of the blue slip, 5 and suggests possible reform. 6
Finally, Professors Lee Epstein, Jack Knight, and Olga Shvetsova compare the
American method of selecting and retaining judges to those of several European
countries.37 Epstein, Knight, and Shvetsova begin with the premise that "a legally
distinguished and independent bench" is a desirable goal. 8 They then empirically
examine the effect of factors such as threshold qualifications (e.g., a minimum age,
24 See id.
25 William G. Ross, The Questioning of Lower Federal Court Nominees at Senate
Confirmation Hearings, 10 WM & MARY BILL RTS J. 119 (2001).
26 See id.
27 See id.
28 See id.
29 See id..
30 See id. at 138,passim.
31 See id.
32 Brannon Denning, The 'Blue Slip ': Enforcing the Norms of the Judicial Confirmation
Process, 10 WM &MARY BILL RTS J. 75 (2001).
33 id.
14 See id.
"' See id.
36 See id.
3' Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Olga Shvetsova, Comparing Judicial Selection Systems,
10 WM & MARY BILL RTS J. 7 (2001).
31 Id. at 8.
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nationality, or legal education requirement)39 compulsory retirement," and fixed-
terms versus life tenure4 of American judges. Epstein, Knight, and Shvestova's
analysis provides insight into factors critics should consider when contemplating
reform.
These articles form a chain of detailed analyses within the broad spectrum of
appointments process scholarship. They are valuable for their historical and
contextual information, and more importantly for their practical recommendations.
The new presidential administration has already altered their treatment of judicial
appointments. The process will almost certainly undergo additional change in the
near future. Those responsible for reform would be well advised to consider the
articles that follow..
Carly Van Orman
See id. at 8.
o See id.
4' See id.
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